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Ole N:u.i regime ha.-. gone do"11 in intamy as one of the most sclf-consciuusl}' cu~rciw
regimes in history. \\'hen studying the J',;ational Socialist-.. men of power and intlw:ncc an: f1.1unJ
in ahundancc. lnJividunls such

n~

I litter, I limn1ler anJ llcl!s receive credit lt)f the inOucnce they

hdd over (icnnan society during that

~:m.

Organizations of individuals. such all the SA <m'-1 SS.

an: also "ell recogni1.eJ fur their ahilit) to control the masses. But in analys is of power during
Nazi rule. one group i~ alm,)!'t universal I)

O\ erlooked:

the dc.-si~;ners and grnphic arti ~t of tl~

Mmistry of Propaganda. l'he Minister of Propaganda. Jo~cph Gochhels. and his estraordinaT)'
c,..ccution of thorough propui-tandu campaigns have hccn discu~sed in detail. But f"'"' con~ider the
o;uhtlc ·yet powerful dTccts of' i~ual communication in Nui poster propaganda and the
trem~:ndous

intlucnce of men like Hans "Mjolnir" Schwcit1.cr. one ofthe most rcnO\\ncd

de-.igncr.. employed by the Minic;U: of Propaganda 'f'heir \\ork
m:.lt~:rials

"a." \ital to the production of

through which the Ntlli" vinually controlled th~ opinions of the nation. The

contributions of men such a~ Schweitzer signifkantly contrihuted to th~ success of Nati poster
propagandaby cmphasiJ.ing srccific

mc~gcs

cxpr(.'Ssed in the: pieces through\ isual

communication. often in a manner not consciousl) noticc..-d hy the vie\\er.

J he usc of racial propaganda was a prominent component of Nazi rule in German}' .
·1hrough its usc. the Nazisgaincd the ability to shaj)\! and mold

th~:

puhlic opinion toward spccitic

population group~ seen as threatening to the Na:~i conccptuali.t:ation of a nc'' Aryan< i~m1an
idcntit) . The group moc;t
anti-Scm111~

famo~l )

targeted by Nazi propaganda was the

Je\\S.

Ho"c"cr. "hilt.·

propaganda was most definitely prc\alent in !'-laJi (icrmany. propaganda \\as also

lc\ dcd against the Bolshc\ 1b. From the 1910s on. '"ith a brid

r~:mission

in the yt!ar..;

bctw~cn

J9J9 and 1941. anti-Bolshc\ il-. propaganda was widespread in Gcnnan} . l'hc general mcssngcs

that

th~

Na1.i pnrty intended tu communicate about the Bol-;hc:' iks in their propaganda. anc.J

2
specifically thmug.h the JX>Sh:rs they circulated.v.cre ollcn apparent through the text. Out these
mes~ges

were also expandc:d Md reinforced through

vi~ual

ctHnmunication. An analysis of the

ekm\!nts of design used in Na7i anti-Bolshe\·ik poster propaganda reveals the underlying
as~niono;

the ~ali pany dc.,ircd tu cummunicate to ito; \ icv.cr~ ahuut the Bobhc .. ih.

A number of books and aniclcs have been written about Nazi propaganda from a
historical perspccti\e.

Mo~t

of these deal \\ ith the types of propaganda that the Na1b used. the

messages thut they i ntendcd to convey. and the historical context of the propaganda pie..:es.
Joseph Gocbbcls and the Ministry of Propaganda arc also v.dl n:prcscnted in historiographic
literature. Several

writer~

have even cxplorcdthe

u~·

of visual propagnndn and symbolism in

Nazi Germany n~ advenising and branding campaigns. Two notnhlc examples of this type of
\\Ork arc IU. Altenholt:n ·s 1111ide...Solace in Symbols: DiS<:O\Cring. Cultural Meanings in
S}mholic Propaganda.. 1and an artidc h> r\icholas o·shaughne'is~ cnuth:d ..Selling llitlcr:
propaganda and the N.ui brand..~. The~ \\orks examine the Notional Socaalisb as an hi~toric:al
example of a marketing campaign and review the methods of cstablishing the

~aJ.i party

brand.

of which the\ isual clements wen~ a component. But the main J(lCus ofth~~ works is the broad
topic of marketing, and do nut uddrcs~ the graphic design clements spcciJically. \\ hik there arc

1

rhb article prm ides an examination of the I• '\ Y logo as a pie..:c of propaganda fwm a
hi~torical socmlog1cal perspective. Altcnholcn discus~s the cultural had. ground of New York
City at the time the logo v.as de~igncd. and points out ho\\ design clement., , .. crc used to send
message~ that the '>late of Nc\\ York believed \\auld increa..,c tourism. I he artide invuh cs Na1i
pmpaganda h~ dr,l\\ mg cornpdri,~m., bct\\ccn the techniques used in the J•N Y logo and \ i~ual
!:>~ mbob used b) the German ~ational Socialists. mo!:>t notably thc usc nf h~ pcrbc.llc and the
.. band,,ag.on tcc hnu.tue··.
~ o·shnughnc.,s) ·' unac.:lc cxc1mines the ~azi part~ as u mttrkcting campaign. llc outlines
the ··produce (the idelllog~ of I hth:r ~md tbc National Socialists). and then looks at r\a7i
propaganda a..-. the m.trJ..cttng tool used tu sell th~ product to the Gcmmn pcoph:. I he artidc
discussc~ the message., the t\a1is inkndcd to marJ..et through pnlpaganda. and lht: usc of Je\"S
and Bolshl.!\ ih as ..the t:ncmy.. to create f.:ar. thus making th~ ..product.. of r\aJ.1 idc0logy more
appealing.

3

plenty of published ''orb that di~uss the historical conh!'\t of N:vi propaganda and the
messages behind the propaganda pieces, there is nothing that spcctlically ani.llyt..es th~ \'isual
dement!-. and design prim.:iplcs thnt were us~d to enhance these messages. The purpose of this
essay is to synthesize the htstoncal contc:xt and grc1phic <.1'--sign clements of Nnzi :mti·Bt)bhe" ik.
propaganda and hridgc the gap bctY.ccn historiograph) and visual analysis.

•
In order to uncovu th~ 'isual
pany regarding the

Bobhcvik~.

•

communi~.:ation cm~ddcd

in the propaganda of the Na:;ri

one must consider the historical conte'<t of the propagand:t

pieces. The functioning of the Na1i Ministl) of Propaganda 3!-. wt!ll ao; the changes in the political
relationship hctwecnGermany and the So' iet Union pia~ an imponant role in detcnnining the
meanings that were conveyed through the usc of design principles in ~azi prupaganda.
The Reich,propuJ!amlaleitunJ!

Na7i Ministry of Public Enlightenment and

Propaganda - was a very organized operation. in "hich Joseph Oocbbcls. the Minister uf
Propaganda. micromanag~d C\ c~ ru.pcct. The u~ uf pn.1paganda b) a modem government '"as
~till

rdath.d) novel. having

~mccn

~en

dc\'elopcd most signiticantl~ during World War I. In the time

1914 and I 918. !loth the Central Powers i.lnd the Allies began to empiO) propaganda in

thdr wur ciTons. Propagandu fullillcd several dill~rcnt
during the ,.,nr. It

\\<lS

fun~tinns

when used by the gowrnments

used by both sides to ..rally the home front and the soldiery in 'iuppon of

the \\ar. mamtain or tx>o~t momlc. \\C:4lkcn the enemy's will to light. and "in over puhlic opinion
in neutral eountnes:..J Antt-<icnnan propaganda '"as uS\.-d to great cfTect by the Allies in World
War I. nnd llitkr remembered the successful tactics of the llnitcd States and Britain when
integrating the use ofpropoganda into hi~ o\\n regime. llith:r C!\tahli-;heJ the GcmHm Ministry of
Steven Lucken and Susan Bachrach. Stult' ~~1 f>t•ccpthm the power ofNo:i pro{XJgundu
(Washington. DC: t·nitcd State~ Holocaust ~1cmorial Museum. 2009). 2.
3

4

Propaganda when he became Chancellor in 1933. Its approach to creating propaganda messages
was heavily influenced by what

Hitl~r

deemed to be the successful strategies of British and

American anti-German propaganda in World War I. which. in his
mind. significantly contributed to the Gem1an defeat. lie outlined
these reasons for British and American propaganda success in .Mein
Kampf: and Gocbbcls incorporated these strategies into Nazi

propaganda in World War II. Chief among these methods were the
simplistic. emotionaL straightforward presentation of content, the
emphasis on a few key points. the honing in on one common enemy.
and the dehumanizing and demonizing of that enemy ...
The Ministry of Propaganda used a variety of outlets to
spread propaganda to the German people. While the\ isual aspects

World War I rcuuttm~·nt poster for
l'nitcd States Arm~. Hitler and
(iochhds appropnat~-d th~· use of
cmottonallsrn and dchumani /..all on
llf the cn~m~ rn carl) Amcncan
pr,1pagand~ for lh~· produclwn of
Na11 propaganda.
th~·

of propaganda were manifested mostly through posters and film.
~azi

propagandists also used radio and campaign speeches. books. placards, leaflets. brochures

and word of mouth as methods by which to influence public opinion. Goebbels was very aware
ofthe German public mindsct on issues, and the propaganda campaigns retlccted and directed
these opinions. lie held conferences almost daily in \.\hich ht! communicated with the leaders of
the Ministry of Propaganda the messages that \\ere to be conveyed through the various types of
propaganda to present a uni tied campaign.
In the mt:ssages of Nazi anti-Bolshe\'ik propaganda. there v.as a strong and conscious
association between Bolshevism and the Jews. thus combining two of the NaLi party's enemies
to created one enemy that the German people could rally against. This affiliation was

_.Ibid. 14.
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accomplished b~ the dairn that ..the Bolshc:\ iks ''ere the: archet~ pes of · Jewish criminal it)·. the
scum of suhhumanity. an anti-Y.orld of loathsome hatred and pcrvcnc:d envy. committed to the
destruction of everything good nnd hcautiful ... s Historian Ro~rt E. I kr~:stcin also put l~mh that
Bobhc\ism was .. a doctrinl.' Y.hi~h ~cures the: World War of the Jl!ws.'-61n Afeinl\amt~f. Hitler
as-,ert~d

that ..(Germans) ought tu rcl·ognize the kind ofaucmpt ''hich is being made by the Jews

in the t\.\Cnticth century to secure dominion over the world." 7 lie daimed that they had hegun
this campaign in Russia. and \\ere next turning their sights to Gcmtan) .
I he u~ uf anti-Bolshc\ ik propaganda by the Na7is mirrored the politicnl relationship of
G~rmany

and the So' iet Union. ln the time between the world wars. there Y.as stmin hcl\\Ccn

<i.:rmany and the Bolsheviks. Gem1an feelings toward

Russian~

had tmditionall) been "a

m1xturc of superiority and tear.'"11 Vcry early in the existence of the ~vj party. Bulshe\ ;,m '"as
targeted

a.-. an enemy. Anthon) R. Rhodes. a Britio;h scholar.'\tatcs that ...by 1921. anti-

Communism "as tim1b cstahli~hcd a.' one of the major th~mcs of Nui propaganda:'il AntiBoJ..,he\ ik propaganda addrcSS\.'tl the Bolshc\ iks as hnth a political entity and a racial group. rhc
Nati('nal Sodnlists emphasized the "stab-in-the·back" legend to enhance the ncgati' c feelings of
the Ot:rman public tov.ard communism. especiall) during their campaign for power. According

to this ll·gcnJ. the n.'usnn lhr the <icmmn defeat in World Wnr I and the resulting hur-.h
repercussions against Gcnnan

"a.' the hetra) al of ( icnnan Iell io;t ' ·10This marked the beginning of

Na.1 i mistrust of and animosity to"ards communism. After the J'rcaty of Non·A~ression

~ Roocn Edwin Hcr.l~"tcin. 711C! War That 1/iller Won <im:Mt<'l\ and lht· .\'cd .\lt•clta
(New York: Paragon House. 1987}. ) 5 I.
11
Ibid. 364· 5.
7
/h) nck A.B /.cman. Na:i Propa~anda (London: Oxford University Press. 1(}64 ). 84.
8
i\
nlht'"'• Ric.: hard Rhmk'\. /'ropuxmula (NC\\ York . <. he I' ca I louse Publishers. 1976 ). 37.
9
lbtd. g4 .
1
Michael Binyon. ·•Bitterness uf ddcat rna) he directed at the West."' Tlrt• l'imt:s (L'nilttd
1\inxdunz). n.d. Nttwsptlper .~·ourc:e Retrieved from l·.BS( '( )hm/
Campai~.rn

6
bct~cen

Gcnnuny ami

th~:

Soviet Union was signed in 19)9. the pwduction of anti-Bobhcvik.

propaganda ceased. though ( i<~bbcls m<tde an effort to keep th~ separation bct\\ccn the Gcm1ans
and Russian~ prevalent. Though the Bobhcviks

\\Crc

no longer rortraycd as u dangerous enemy.

the racial difll'rl'ncel> bt!twl-en Gennans and So\'ict Slavs were emphasized in order to
separation !xtV.l"Cil the tw<> groups ...Gocbbels. v.ho evident!)

~a'" th~

\\hat it rcall) was -a political-power alliance for a limit\!d period

pact from

th~:

kc~p

the

outs\!t for

and therl.'l(m: tried to

prc\'c:nt the emergence of a pro-soviet climate of opinion ... 11 This approach madl' it easier for the
Ministry uf Propaganda in 1941. when the Germans launched Operation 13urbarossa. to revert
back to anti-Ilclbhc\il materials. though thi..; time '' ith a ditlcrcnt angle.
In (ioebbcb · cnnfcrcncc v. ith leaders of the Ministry of l'ropuganda nn S July

19~ I.

he

outlined the ~vi~· re\ iscd approach to k\\-ish-Bol,.hcvism:
Gem1any''> o,quMmg ol ac~uunll> w11h Mo'iCov. 1~ nov. unco,·enn~ and
unmaslo;ing the greateo;t Je"' "h <;\\ indk of all times. The · v.orker~ · p3rut.ll'c · is
"""' n:\oealcd 111 the world a' a gigantic s~ :.tern of che3h illld c\plullcr.., 111
v.hu;h the \~nrl.cr\ arc Ctlfllpclled b) the mo'it l:llood) terTCirll.lllllll h1 li\c in a
mdc~nhllhl) pitiful cxilltcnct in inhuman condllltln~ . Thi.' sy~em \\hen: Je"'·
CBpltAJI'it\ and Uolshcviks ....-orl.. hand in glo\e, hao; crca1cd a Quite rn~oncci\\lhlc
tkgrcc Ill hurnC\n depra" II) What million\ of< tt~nnan troc.1p~ arc '>ecin~ Ihere
todn) i'>api,·turc of the lov.c\1 possible sociallh ing 'ltdn!J.lrd lrom the pruful
hmcb ami Ike-ridden homes. ncgkctcd roJd, ant.llilth) "1113!-!C' to the be~tiJI
dr.tbnc" (If lhctr cntir~ C'Oistence. B) me am ol thcu dtahoh~al '~ \tc.'m ot
Bol!>hc' ism. the Jcv. s ha\ e t:&'l'>t lhc pct)plc l'f thl· ~~\ 1ct t niun JOlt' thr~
uu.,po.·.tl....thl~· clmdUJon ot dcepc... t human mi.,el') The mn'll. hM nov. hecn tom
uiT thr~ ~reate\! C<llllidencc trick c.'\cr pructkcd in the hl\hJry ul mankind I he
1
'''u~lc m the hl\t me.tn' the lihcration (.If m.ml...md from ''' ~.nn•c ~
Go~bbcls U"il-d

infomtati()n l)f condition~ in the So\ ict Union. v. hil:h Gcmlan soldiers SO.I\\ as

they marched through th~ country a.; evidence against Jc\\S and Bol..;heviks. !'his evidence ufthe

11

Willi A Bocld..c. cd .... Praised be what makes us hard.'' in Ute! ,\'ec:rt•t ( 'on{im•nct!l of
/)r (jm•hhe'l": 71tt' .\'cd l'rOfXlfUmda Wur, 1939-.fJ. 2"11 ed .• tmns. F\\ald O~rs (N~w York:.
E.P. Dutton. 1970). 16.
12
Willi A. Bodck.c. ell., ··The \eil drops." in 1nt! .'tt•crt•t ( 'ml/erfn,·e.-. olDr. Gm:hh,•f,.·
The Na=t Pmpuxundu War. 1939-./3. ~nd cd .• tram•. l:.wald Oscrs (New York: E.P. Dutton.
1970). 177.

7

cllccts of Unlsh\!\ ism. which \\as attributed to Jewish influence. resulted in l\\n main mco;sagcs
that \\\!rc sent through Nvi propaganda. Fin,t was the continued emphasis of the contmst
hctwccn the Slavs. who were vulncr.1bk to the intlucncc of Oolsbevism. and the <il·nnans. 'Jhi ~
l(x:u~

coincided\\ ith tht.: s~onJ emphasis. \\.hich wa<> the ml'll\.-ctiw and destructi\e nmun: of

Bolshl!vism. I hcsc l\\ u t~mcs \\'ere used not necessarily to generate feelings of hostilit)
tO\\ards the RtL,sian JX.'Oplc in gencrdl. hut to steer public opinion away from Bobhc' ik
~ympathies .

.. [here is only one !>logan \-\hich must he proclaimed again and again. <md that is

our light against Bolshevism." Gocbbcls asserted Juring another Ministr) ()f PmrmganJn
confcrence."Today Ru~sia is waging her war under the slogan of nationalism and can theret(m:
lind support among all sccuons uf the narion. Our propaganda slogan for the [a~t mu...t thcrcl'ilrc

he that \\Care not against the Russian nation but only against Bubhcvism.''IJ <.il)Cbbcb

alsnlikcned the Bolsheviks ooth to bacterium and to rdt~.

"hi~.:h

can sun ive in \\U~ condition~

than domc~tic animal~ ~cau!>C they an: used to Ji.. in~ among lilth. 14 These comparisons \'ten:
a)~)

tmnslatcd into 'isual ao;s<>eiations in poster propaganda.
Follo\'-ing the Gcm1an defeat at Stalingrad. anti-Rol~hc' i~ ml-ssagc::. hl'Camc the primm:

fow~

ofNa:ti propaganda. On 12 l·cbnwry· 1943. just at\er the Ocrman army surrcndcrl-d at

Stalingrad. ( iucbhcls urged the leaders of the Ministr) of Propaganda lhut "the struggle again~t
Bobhcvi!>m and the danger of the Bolshe\ ization of [:uropc arc at present occupying our friends
and cn\!mic~ in an

e~ual

mca,urc. Our struggle against Rolshc\ b.m must no\\ dominate all

Willi A. Boclc~c. cd .. "Do you \\ant total war?." in J11e Seaet ( 'on(erence.'i of Dr
<.ioehhds: The Ned ProP£tKCJndu War. 1939-./3.200 ed .• tram•. F\\ald Osc~ (Nc~ York: E.P.
Dutton. Iq70). 320.
,_.Willi A. Roclc~c. cd .. "Don't be too lair.- in Th«> ,\'ecrt!l Cunlerencc•s of Dr (jot•hhels.
11w .\"azi l'ruJXIRanda War. 1939--13. ::?nd cd .• trans. 1:\\ald Oscrs (N~w York: F.P. Dutton.
1970). :!54-5.
13

8

pro(l3ganda media as the grc<tt and all-rcrvading propaganda themc.'' 1 ~Uoebbels alsll
emphasized the importance of Nazi propaganda using the fear of Bnbhcviks ovemmning
(iermany as incentiH: to maintoin suppon t(,r the Gcmlan army. ''The theme ·F.urope as a
Ru-.sian slave camp: v.hich Goehhd~ played on right up to the end. \\<JS undoubted!) cticctivc
in keeping the Germans lighting. ·strength through f'i.--.u-' he calkd it.''u' rhc Ministl) of
Propaganda used thc~e I undamcntal thl'mcs to spread a picture of v. hat could become of
(il'rmany ...lfthc Russians penetrated into Germany.IG<ll'hhdsJ

\\antL'tJ.

the young <.icm1an

m:.mhoo<.l would he carried off to Siberia \"thile her \o,.omanhood would he deliH~red to the lust of

!><.l\'agcs from the stcppc~.'' 17 And. the Na7is added. the destruction and dt.-cimatJon \\Ould not
~top

in

German~.

Hitler a.-,scrted that ..the Jcv.ish-Bol~he\ ik rulers alone have end~,·ored. from

Moscuw during the past t\\O decades. to s~:t on tire not only Germany. but th.: \\hole of

Europe.'' 18 In order to prove this point. and to counter the spre;:sding rumor that the Uobhc\ iks
v.ould only kill those in the l'-iati

pnn~.

uoebbds cncourctgl!d the spread of propaganda that

shov.ed victims \\ho v.crl.! ..workers and other members of the broad

mas~-.

in the tcrritoric~

u\crrun h) the Bolsheviks:' 1Q The German defeat at Stalingrnd and the fear it produced \\ithin
the f'.i.vi

pan~

hl!a\'il}' intlucnct!d the messages of their lmti-Bolshe\'ik propaganda. both in

tl'Xtual content and vi•mal communication.
•

•

•

•

In order to con\e} messages otbout the Bolshc\ il' in their propaganda. the Ministl)' of
Propaganda employed certain l!!>tabli~hl'd fundamentalc; of design in their posters. I hl' usc of

IS
16

17
111
1
"'

Bodde. "Do )'OU
Rhodes. 37.
Ibid. 37.

\\Wlt

total war?". 330.

Zeman. 100-1.
Docld..c. "Do )'OU \\ant tutal warT. 333.

9

the:se fundamental., allm\cd the Natis to e:mphasi7e and reinforce the messages that \\en: spread
throughout their propaganda campaigns. Some vi~ual messages wen! more uhvious than ntlu:rs.
Sinc:c: 'buaJ communicati...m through design ,.,as not an area in '' hich the typical O~nnan civilian
was proficient. the mc!-.sagc!-. wen! often arrived at subconsciously. AknO\\Icdgc: of design •md
the methods of visual communication can help one discern lum the theme'> the Nazis mh:ndcd to
tmnsmll regarding the Bulo;hevib \\crt:

intu~cd

into the 'i:-.ual dc~ign and layout of Na1i

propaganda poster.,.
There arc fiw basic principles of design: unit). emphasis. balance. rh)thm and contrast.
In addition. there arc other thc..~rics of d(."Sign that can contrihutc to visual communication. T-...o
important theories for the analysis ofNv.i propaganda arc those of color and cyeflow. l'he US\.' of
these principles and theories. and the -;ucccssful interaction hl:twecn them achico,.e visual
communication. I'hcrc arc abo rules that accompany the usc of the principlcl- of design. and the
intentional breaking of these guidelines creates tension and discord in a composition. v.hich can
serve just as much tu communicate as follo"ing the rulc11.
The principk of unit) cre<th!s the Ji!cling that aJI the ckments that arc contained in n piece
belong together and \\ere meant to he

tn

the composition. "Unity means that a congruity ur

a~rccmcnt exists among the elements in a design: they look as though the} hclong to"cthcr. as

though some visual connection hcyond mere chance ha.; cau~~ them to come togcther.'' 20 l ' nit}
can be created h) placing the elements in the same area of a composition. by repeating the ~amc
dcmc.!nt. sometime:. "ith a variation. or hy connecting the dement~ of a composition hy eydlow.
The principk of cmpha11is is t:rucial to design. and especially tor the designers of Na.ti
propagaru.Ja. Emphasis reveals the ohjcct th.u ... hould he considered of greatest imponancc in a
20

2()()g). 27

David A. Lauer and Stephen 1\~ntak. De...ign Ba.\·ic.\ , (Boston: Thomson Wads\\urth.

10
compusition. A ln~ul point is mndc: to ~land out from th~ r~sl of th.: pi..:ce. either by being a
ditli:rc:nt color or \laluc than its surruunding. or by a difli.>r~ntiation in si1c. A designer rna) alow
~

cyeflow to direct the vic"er"s attention to the focal point. or literally set the object apar1 hy

isolating it from

C\ crything

else in the piece in order to dra'" attention to it. B) making one par1

of a piece stand out. the principk of emphasis shows the viewer , .. hat to

thm~

of as the rnnst

important element of the composition.
Balance in terms of design can he defined a.' -the di ..tribution of\ i~ual v.eight \\ithin a
composition:'21 If u composition is halanecd. the ·'visual wdght... or attention that is attracted
from each elem.:nl. \\ill he ettual on both sides of the pi~e (top and bullnm. or right and left). A
balanced image presents the mc~sagc of stability and security. When a composition is
unbulanced. ··a ccnain vague uneasi~ss or dissatisfaction results. We ted the need to rearrange
the dements in the ~e way that \\e automatieall} straighten a picture on the ''ali."' 12 Balancc
can he dthcr ~)mmctrical . in "hich hc.lth sides contain th~ !lame ckmcnts in the same pattern. ur
asymmetrical. "hic.:h is composed uf diiTcrent elements that ar.: armngcd in a way that dnt\\ S

c4ual

~mention

to both sides of the composition. This t} pe of balance can he achi~v,:d thruugh

color. pattern. or the negative space (areas that surround the item). By cith~o-r making thl!
composition balanced. or intentionally removing the stabilit) that a

balun~ed

piece produces. a

d"signer can impress a mood or fcding upon his viewer. simpl~ by heing aware of where he
places each piece of his design.
Rh)1hm . in the context of d~sign. refers to the movement

l )f the

Yicwer' s eye a~o·ross a

piece and the repetition of elements throughout the e)cs' path. The " rhythm" that the clements
create for the eye can he smooth. spread out and flo~ing. or vef) regulah~d and e\'en regiment~o-d .
21
22

Lauer and Pcnuk. 90.
Ibid. 90.
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The later gives a

pi~c~

a structun..-d. planned look. ·while the

fonn~r creal~!\

a sense nf

disorganization or improvisation.
The final principle of design is contrast. In a cumposition, ..Contr.1st stresses the' il>u<.~l
diffcn:nccs in si7c. shape and color bct''"-cn the clemcnb to ~nham:c the ~rccption of a m~-.~gc
intended. Contra!lt al~o draws and dirt."t:ts \'icwer's attention to specific arcus of infonnation.''1 l
Contra!\l is used to articulate the hierarch~ of imponancc of the components of a piece to the
viewer. It can be a.: hie\ cd h} val') ing the size. shape. value or color of an object. and can be usc:d
to create a focal point or to direct eyeflow.
In addttwn to the principles of design there are theories of design. two of" hich are
csp.-cially important to the analysis ofNv.i propaganda and the messages regarding the
RnlshcviLs that \\ere intended to be o.cnt through the visual aspects of their design. The tirst of
these theories is color. Euch color contains three properties: hue. \'aluc ami '\aturation or
intensity. Hue is the technical tcnn li>r ''hat is generally meant by referring to "color"'. Red.
omngc. yellow and green arc examples of hue. The term "color.. refers to the more s~cilic
variation of a hu~. depending on its value and intensity. I h~ value of a color measure!- the
lightm..-ss or darlncss of a hue. Adding "'hite to a

pur~

hue is r~f~rr~ to us tinting. "'hilc adding

blael is kn0'-''11 a.-. shuding. The value of a color increase~ or decrcast:s depending on the amount
of"' hite or hlad it contains. Inc linal property of color is intensity. or the brightness of a color.
I h~ intensity or perceived intensity- of a hue is afTcck"d hy its complement. According to color
theory. a hue's compliment is its opposite on the color whcd. Thus. r~ and grL-cn. orange and
blue. ~clio\\ and \iolet. are complementary hues. Mixing a hue with its complement ''ill
dccrea~c

the intensity of the color. Eventually. if enough of the comph:mentary hue

i~

add<."<.!. the

[·l iLabcth Resnick. /.k!liKil tor ( 'ommunicatimr: t.'onceptuul wapltk Jestgn hask!f
cllobokcn. NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 2003). 25.
2J
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color ,.,.;11 become grc) or bro\\11. On the other hand. a colors intensity rna~ he visually
increased so the color ap~ars brighter and mort:' ihrant by placing it next to its complement.
Color theory ..md the interaction hctwccn colors play vcr} important roles in \'isual
comnlunication. especially in the works of Nazi posh:r propaganda.

A second theory that is valuable in the: analysis of the visual

communic~llon

of NU/.i

propaganda is that of eyetlow. A designer considers \\hat he puts in a composition. and \\here he
places it in order to first dra"... the vie\\ers attention to the pi1.'Ce and thc:n din~'' the eye through
the piece. usually ending \\ith or returning to the focal point. Eycflow can he conducted through
lines. real or implied. from one objc..-ct to the next~ or the arrangement of shapes. When a human
or am mal is depicted in a composition. the' icwcr natur.dl) tends tn look at the eyes Jirst. then
fnlluw the line of sight nf the imuge. A designer can usc this kno\\ ledge hl direct eyetlow in a
piece that includes living creatures.
The interaction of the principles of design rarely '>tand on their O\\n. Most often. thc
ckmcnts of the principles overlap multiple times in one composition. For example. color can he
used to create a focaJ point. while simultaneou!>ly creating a sense of unity though the color
~chcmc. rhe arrangement of identical objects can establish unity. halam:e .md rh~1hm . Although

individually dcfmcd. th~ principles of design interact and intc:rt" inc "ith each other to
communicate through a design piece.
Knowing the principles of design is n~.--cessar) to und~n.tanding the \ isual communication
a pic<.·c contains. llnwcver. it is also important to w1dcrM:md that th..:sc principles can be tluid in
thc.·ir application and interpretation. Bc.:au....e of the uni"{UC clements in a compo<iition and the
\3r)ing interaction ~t\\ecn the dill~n.·nt pans and principles contained in a design piece.
gcneraliLcd translation of visual communication cannot be clc:anly applied to every design. But if
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un~

und.:rstands that the individual dements of a composition \\ere arrunged as they \\Cn: for a

reason and is a\\ arc of the principles of design. underlying messages int..:ndcd hy the designer
can he.: uncoH·rcd.
•

•

•

With knc.w.Jcdgc of the clements of design. it is possible to analyi'e the VIsual aspect of
"hat the pi~e is communicating. and the extent to which Na~i designers infuS4!d

th~:ir

compositions ,.. ith dements that produced c:xtremdy negative.- messages regarding th~:
Bobhcviks becomes very apparent. The tollowing anal~sis ust!s examples of Nazi anti-Bobhc\ ik
propaganda to illustrate lht! ways in \\hich the Nvi propaganda otlice used design clements in
their posters.
·1wo examples of Nui

<mti-Bul~he\ il

propaganda wmc from the Gn:at Anti-Bul ..hc\ il

Shm\. I his exhibition was a collection of propaganda

pk-cc~

created hy the Central Prnpaganda

Ollicc. and tra\ ckd to major German cities in order tu spread the inl(mnation through the Rcic.:h.
1hi.' exhibition \\as st•t up as an cducationul exhibit of motcri:lls. and
booklet discussing what
Bnbhc\ ism in

Rus~i•t.

t~ l'a~is

\\<L'>

accompanied by a

claimed -...as th~ dangerous nature and ne~ativc etTects of

It also scr\cd to dra~

connc~:tionshct-...ccn

the concept of Bolshevi~m <md

the: Jews. I he ~:xhibit was displayed throughout Gemmny from 1937until I 939. when antiBolo;hc\ il

propa~anda

\\cnt dormant a.-, a result of the II iller-Stalin pact.

The poster fur the Great Anti-Bolshevik sho\\ in lkrlin (Image A) is an example of how
VIsual

d~m~nts

hccau~c

\\ere

u~cd

to spread meaning in

Na~i

propaganda. I he artist is unkno-... n. hut

it '~""a product of the Propaganda Ollice. <iocbbcl~ -...ould ha\'c approved the piece:

hcli.lre it was displayed for the public. The title of the poster is ··B(llshevism l'nmaslcd··. J"hc
pmJ:!mm that accompanied the cxhihit expounded upon the idea of the ..mask .. that the show -
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supposedly

rcmo,cd Soviet Russia was called the ..worker"s paradise...

Ho"'~ver.

the

propaganda pamphlet state!> that ··Behind this peaceful mask of an impos)ihlc and insane vision
of human happinc~s...

,.,.a., the li.>undation of the Jewry's plan to build an -.cc.:urc \\nrld ruk'', and

that "Incapable of any creative accomplishments. I Ru.-.sia · s Jewish leaders]

dc~troy

all Sl>Cial

order. destroy all culture and all ethnic life. creating chaos in '' hic.:h humanity threaten~ to
collap~e.'' 2<4 The poster reflects the argument that the linl-;hc' ik is responsible l(>r dc<llh und

dc:,tructiun of civili1.ation. l'bc poster sends the message thut if Uolshc' ism spreads. communists
will kill and destroy anything in thdr path. ·1 he artist uses the visual ckmcnts of linc/cycflow.
pcrsJX!Ctive. color and c.:ontmst to send these messages. 1 here is an implied line from the head of
the dead m~n m the bottom left comer that continues upwan.l and diagonally through the
Bolshevik ·ll robe to the whip. and «."nds in the upper right comcr ••t the Bul-;hcvi~ ·.,. lace and
upraised hand lhis creates a \isual connection bet"~" the Bolshc' ik·~ action~ and the d!!ath of
the man in the lm,cr left. The entire composition accentuates this line. through the
background and the

Bol~ihc:vik's

llam~s

in the

body. This line also addo; to the clement of perspective, which

makes the: Bol'he' ik appear to he larger than lite anc.l looming over his victims. I he colors that
arc u~cd abo add to the visual

mc~sagc

that is ~nt through the poster. Red and gn:cn arc

complementary coiLns. and so when placed next to each other. as they nrc in the dead man's skin.
his blood and th'-• tlamcll in the background. they make each othcr appear more vibrant. ·1he red
make~

the tinted gn:cn s~in appear sickly. and the low-saiUration green contrasts with the high!>

satur..ucd red of the blood. making it look more' ihrant and shocking. I he contmst bct\\ccn the
light colors used in the victim) and the dark colors used on the B{'lshc\ i~ also add to the nc~ativc

RanJalll3yt"crk. "The Great Anti-Bolshc\ist E:-.hibitiun:· 1937. accc~~'d I-I April
201 :!: a\ ntlabh: from http: ''""'' .cal\ in.'--c.Ju acadc=mic/cas•gp..l ~ulti-tl\1bhcvi~m.htm: Internet.
24
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messotgc that is sent through this poster about the Bolshl!,·iks. along \\ ith other pi ecce; in the
Oreat Anu-Bolshc\ jl; Sho" .

Inc Great Anti-Bolshevik Sho\\ contained other anti-Bol!.hc\ iJ.. propaganda rosters
created by tht> 1\;a~is . The poster advertizing the exhibition (Image B) also dc:monstr.ttc!'> hm.\
'1sual dement~ "crc u~d to convey messages in N.vi propaganda. As with the prc\-·ious image.
the artist of for this po~tcr is unknown. hut it was also part of the Great Anti-Bol!->hevi!oot
h:hibition that was crcutcd by the Central Propaganda Ol1kc in I 93 7. lhe poster sends the
mcs..al!c that it is the Bolshevik goal tn take over the world. Thi~ rcHccts the mcs~gc that the
N.vi part~ attempted to spn:ad ahout the Bolshevists. and complements the content of the Great
Anti-Oolshc\'i!lm l:.~hibition. I he artist uses complementilr) colors to make the rcdish-orange
~tand

out more and appear more vibrant. B) using a hum<m "kull fur the spider'~ head. the anist

gives the villain human qualities (or gives the Bolshc\ ilc.. negative. spider-like qualities). There
arc also significant messages associated with the image of the spider. B) using a spider to
rcpn:~nt Bol~hevism.

the propa~nda poster connt."Cto; the negative aspects of ~riders to the

Nazi's enemy. The spider can be linked to the! idea of a predator that is about to kill and eat its
pre}. the ns1>0ciation with being trapJ.ll!d in a web. and the dangerous. pobonous nature uf
spiders. By using a spider to visually re!present the Bolshevik.,, the Na~i Mini~try of Propaganda
linked the B..ll~hc" iks to ncgati\>c ideas of domination and ,teat h. The artist abo added an
clement of discomfort b) por1m)·ing the Bolshc\ ilc.. spider much larger than life. In addition to
gh ing the spider the apJ.ll!arancc of overshadowing it~ "ictims. this deliberate skewing of
proportion visually reitcr-o~tcs the message that the Bol!!hcvib intended to take mer the entire
world.
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Another poster that emphasizes the claim that world domination v.a._ the goal of Jcv. ish
Bnlsht:\ ih is " I he Jewish Conspiracy against Europe" (Image C). This poster v.as distributed in
Fmncc in 194) during the.: (icm1an occupation. fhc intended audience

''a~

the citizens of

occupied France. and wa-. circulated in order to justil)· the har.t~smcnt and deportation of Jcv.s
that occurrell. and to knd crcdibilit) to preexisting stereotypes and intolerance of Jcv. ~ in
France. 2 ~As propaganda. the image served as an attempt to connect the ulliuncc bct\\ccn ureal
Britain and the Soviet l Inion v. ith u malicious Jcv. ish plan of t.lnmination. This message is
tlt:ratt:d hoth through

tl~

text and the visual

element~ .

l'hcre arc se\ cral 'isual element.; in pia} that a.'isist in the communication of the nlCs::.age
uf the intended domination nf the Je\\s through Bolshevism. The emphasis of the piece is the
slyly smiling Jev. ish face at the top of the piece. The viewer' s eye ts directed b) the implied line
of the Jev. ' s line of sight to the center of the poster. v.hcrcthe pcr-;onificd Britain and Soviet

L'nion an: shake hands. ~ccause of the line of perspc.'Ctive. the clasped hands appear to be do~cr
h,

the viev.cr than their bodies. thu" emphasizing the

fa~t

that th«!) ha\·e just made an agreement.

The piece has a nearly symmetrical vi!luaJ balance. with one person on each of the sides <lf the
composition. and text 'ituated on the top and bouom of the posh:r. In the center of the poster. the
Jew· s face and the handshake on top are halanccd by the large landmas!t of l ~urope underneath.
Color also pla)s an important role in the visual communication that takes place in thi~ pi'--cc."The
design is \\ell exccutt!d. \\.ith excellent usc made of the contrast' between the clear blue of the
~ca. the Jeep red of Great Britain and So\ iet Rusc;ia. and the steely grey of llitlcr' s Europe.··2" In

addition tu the contrasting hues. the inh:raction be tv. ccn the Ji tTcring saturations and values

2

~ Peter Young. cd .. J/Ju.\fralt•d World War II f;nqdo~Jia Vol. 24 (II.S. ~tuttm;m. Inc.
1978). J2K6.
2., Ibid.
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contrihute interesting \'isual

message~

tu the piece. ·1he Jc~ is !>urroundcd by a d,uk value. v. hich

giws him an ominou5 appearance. Also. b~ using highly satur:ltcd colurs of blue. red and )ellow
l(lr most of the composition. then depicting the Jew '' ith a low-saturated. light tint of green
ma~es

the Jew appear sickly and diseased in comparison to the other dements of th~

composition. '1hroughout the clements that appear in this po~tcr. negati\·c 'isual messagt.'~
regarding hoth Jews and 11olshc' ih that were intended li.u the occupied French arc apparent.
Another mui-Bul~hc' ik. propaganda poster tho.tl wa!\ distributed in a Gcmum-occupied
territory "a!\ entitled .. Never!" (Image 0). ·1 his was designed in llJ41 and cin:ulatcd in occupied
lkloru'>sia after tht' Germans tx·gan their invasion of Russia. 1 he intent of the poster"~ to s~ay
publk opinion tov.arJ the Gcrrnans. ~ 7 lne text reads ..Germany is lighting and your cflorts "ill
'k.I\C

Europe from Bubhcvi!.m:'28 I he image of the poster coincides with the message that

Bolshevism was deadl} and to be feared. In the piece. 13olshevism is sho"n as a ravaging wolf.
The focal point of the poster is the wolfs vi brand} red. blood) mouth. 1-rom the focal point. the
eye is drawn
forehead.

up~ard

thu~

toward the wolfs eyes and the hammer and ~id.. lc emblem stamped on the

distinguishing it a!'> Bolshevik. From then:. I he viewer's eye lollm\s ttl.! line of the

wolf's body to the sJ...ull al its feet. and tinally to tht: text ut the hotlom of the posh:r.. , he
dements of thl· image at th\! top of the poster arc hal anced hy the dark tc:\t at the holtom.
Contra~t

pla)s a significant role in the visual communication ,,f thi!- piece. By maJ...ing the upper

rig.ht comer of the poster dark. the artist creates the illusion that the wolf is emerging from a dark
and dangerous place. Inc: majority of the composition has \'CI) little color. and
used it dull and \\ashcd-out.
red. bloody and shocking.
27
:!II

Young.. 3:!8-l.
Ibid

ll\i~

v.h&~t

culor is

maJ..cs the \-ibrant red of the wolfs mouth to appear cvt!n more

lB
I he tina I poster in this analysis is titled "Victory or Bulsh\:vism!"( Image I:). rhe (ldSt\:r
was designed by II an~ Sch" cit1cr "ho wasonc of the most rcnm'11ed graphic anists tor the Nat.i
Ministry of Propaganda. This poster was created as part of a propaganda campaign in 19.t3 aner
the Germano; were defeated at Stalingrad. The campaign \\as organized by the Na.t.i Central
Propaganda Oflicc in respon~ to the German dcfcm by the Ru-.sians.
As part of the campaign that it''~ created for. th~ poster is used to inspire Gemlans to
tight aguinst the Russians aflcr the defeat at Stalingrad. The poster viliHcs the Bolsheviks .md
presents an ultimatum

~tween

winning and hctng o\l'n.:ome by Bolshevism. 'l'hc message that is

sent is that bolshc'\ ism will le<ld to death and destruction. 'I his is communicated through vbual
cllntrast bct\\Cen the lightncs~ of the Oem1an side of the durknc~s of the Rnlshc\ i~ side of the
po~tcr.

This contrast visually emphosi.t.cs the dichotomies of the Germans and Bolshe\iks. On

thc lcli side of the poster. tht: Gcm1an is presented as
mu~culinc

f~minine.

vulncrahlc tmd endangered hy the

hrutality of the male Bolshevik representation on the opposite side of the po~ter. 'I he

German~. dl!picted as u smiling mother and child. arc visually associated with happincs~ and

nurturing. '"hich conlm~l strongly with the di!>tres~cd and dr:pmved images linked \\ith
Bol~hevi!>rn.

The Bobhcvik is also visually sho" n as tilth> and unkempt.'' hill! the Gcnnans are

dean and tidy.The emphasized contrast hctwccn the Ocrmun.;; and Bnlshcvih in this poster is
atccntLmtcd through the 'isual contrasts the poster contains.
The poster embodies the ideal that a Genn~m ddcat \\ould result in the rise of
communi!>m. and that this would in turn bring death. disca-.e and destruction on Gcnnany. as
well ~''the violation of Aryan purity. The message would still he clear to the audience during tht>
original campaign. but

th~)'

ma) nut haw jumped directly to the conclusion that thb pdster was

propaganda and that the ~tui party

\\US LJ) ing

to inllucncc thcm against the Bolshc' iJ...s.
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Through the usc of the clements of design. the propagandists of the N:u:i party
emphasized and rcitcratc..-d the mt:ssages that were communicated in the text of anti-Bolshe\ ik
propaganda posters.Bccause the visuaJ aspects of the posters were not often analy:Lcd by the
<Judiencc. the communication of the design was more subtle and easily accepted than verba l or
\Hittcn v..ords because it afTcctcd the subconscious feelings and thoughts. The points that Y.ert:
made by the posters reflected the themes of the Naz.is regarding Bolshevism: that it v.as
dangerous and would lead to death and destntction ofGem1an~ ifthc Jews v.·cre to fulfill their
go:1ls through Bolshevism and invade tirst Gennany and then the rest of the world. Because
designers for the Ministry of Propaganda \\ere able to manipulate the component~ of each poster
to visually communicate these messages in a way that subconsciously supported und extended
the impact of the written propaganda, their often unacknowledged contributions were invaluable
to the success of what has become knov. as one of the most extraordinary propaganda campaigns
in history. Stephen I leiter. a graphic design analyst who has researched tht! use of symbolism and
branding in totalitarian regimes. concludcs,"Grnphic designers have power. They are used
sometimes. They arc misused sometimes. But they contribute to the power of the state. They
contribute to the power of a party.''29

Stc' en llellcr. School of Visual Arts, Paul Rand Lt.•(·ture ,\'eries: St~\·t•nllella on
Branding the Tmalituriun Stale. video. 22:59. 27 April 2007. JTuncs ll .
2
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Image A: ·'Bolshevism Unmasked." 1937.
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Image B: ''Poster for the Great Anti -Bolshevism Show:· 1937.
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Image C : ··1 he Je\\ ish Conspirac) .·· 194 3.
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Image D: ..1\:e\er!'' 19-J I.
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Image E: ..Victory or BolsheYism! .. 1943.
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